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Abstract
In this paper, we empirically examine how information about a neighborhood
affects the level of lending activity in it.  Specifically, do lenders deny mortgage
applications at higher rates in neighborhoods where they have little experience in
evaluating applications, and/or in neighborhoods where the lending community in
general has little experience?  The analysis uses data collected under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) for 1990 and 1991 to construct denial rates for each
lender in each census tract, controlling for applicant characteristics observed in the
HMDA data.  We then estimate the relationship between these lender-tract denial rates
and both the number of applications processed by the lender in that neighborhood and
the number of applications processed by all lenders in that neighborhood, controlling
for other characteristics of the census tract and for the lender. 
We find that the more applications a lender processes from a given
neighborhood, the lower the neighborhood-lender denial rates -- both statistically and
economically.  Furthermore, we find that the low number of applications taken by
individual lenders from specific low-income and minority neighborhoods does
contribute to the relatively high denial rates in these neighborhoods.  These findings are
consistent with recent theoretical models linking redlining to incomplete information.1
Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) to combat
redlining, an alleged practice in which lenders curtail the supply of mortgage credit to
particular neighborhoods, discounting the creditworthiness of the applicants because the
neighborhood itself is considered undesirable.  Under the CRA's provisions, regulators
are to use their supervisory authority to encourage each depository institution to help
meet the credit needs of their communities -- including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods -- consistent with safe and sound lending practices.
Property location clearly affects mortgage credit flows and approval rates.
1 
Lenders worry that houses located in neighborhoods containing some dilapidated and
vacant properties, low rates of owner-occupied units, and low rates of property turnover
expose their collateral to price depreciation.  Obviously, lenders have an incentive to
acquire information about the neighborhoods in their service areas, just as they do
regarding information about applicants’ ability to repay loans.  Information about
applicants and neighborhoods is expensive to collect and process, so lenders also face
incentives to collect only the amount and type of information that leads to efficient
lending decisions.   Numerous studies have examined the use of race as an information
variable for credit market decisions.
2
                    
     
1  See Barth, Cordes, and Yezer (1979), Benston (1981), Canner (1981), Avery and
Buynak (1981), Bradbury, Case, and Dunham (1989), and Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman
(1994).
     
2  See Canner, Gabriel, and Wooley (1991), Gabriel and Rosenthal (1991), and Duca and
Rosenthal (1992) as recent examples of research explicitly examining loan-market
imperfections.2
Economists have long recognized that information imperfections in credit
markets can generate divergent outcomes for borrowers of different types.
3    Recent
papers by Lang and Nakamura (1993) and Gruben, Neuberger, and Schmidt (1990)
present theoretical models of redlining based on incomplete information.  In this paper,
we empirically examine how information about a neighborhood affects the level of
lending activity in it.  In doing so, we touch on two aspects of the debate concerning the
CRA.  First, does the overall goal of increasing lending in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods improve the efficiency of the mortgage market?  Second, is the current
requirement that each individual lender be active in these neighborhoods the most
efficient method of achieving the goal of increasing aggregate lending? 
Both Lang and Nakamura, and Gruben, Neuberger, and Schmidt argue that since
lenders receive few applications from low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, they
have little information about how to evaluate the applications.  Therefore, they tend to
deny them more often than they do applications from higher-income neighborhoods,
where the lending market is more active.  While both papers focus on the role of
information, they differ in the way they model the information.   As a result of this
difference, the models have different implications for the efficient design and
enforcement of the CRA. 
In Lang and Nakamura, information is a public good:  As one lender increases
lending in a neighborhood, it generates information that is beneficial to all potential
                    
     
3  See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1987) for descriptions of the standard models.3
lenders there.  For example, the authors argue that each transaction generates
information on the value of houses in the neighborhood that all lenders can use in their
property appraisals.  As the number of transactions increases, appraisals become more
precise, reducing lender uncertainty about house values.  Since borrowers can default
when a property is overvalued but lenders do not share in gains when a house is
undervalued, greater uncertainty will lead lenders to deny more applications. 
Since all lenders can use information from each transaction in their appraisals,
this is a classic externality problem.  Because lenders do not capture the full value of
the information contained in their transactions, they will underinvest in neighborhood
information, and the number of loans made in neighborhoods with few loan
applications will be suboptimal.  We refer to this as the external effect of information. 
By encouraging lending activity in these neighborhoods, the CRA increases efficiency
in the lending market.   Furthermore, it doesn't matter if all lenders increase lending or
if just a few do, because the information generated by the transaction is available to all
lenders.  Therefore, according to Lang and Nakamura's model, the CRA's requirement
that all lenders be active in these neighborhoods could be an efficient means of
increasing lending.
In Gruben, Neuberger, and Schmidt (1990) the information generated by the
transaction is a private good, accruing only to the lender actually engaged in the
transaction.
4   We refer to this as the internal effect of information.  As lenders increase
                    
     
4 In a more general formulation, one could consider other fixed costs of neighborhood
lending, such as an office.4
their activity in a neighborhood, they gain information that they can use in processing
subsequent applications for properties in the same neighborhood, lowering per-unit
processing costs.  If lenders cannot differentially price across neighborhoods, they will
tend to reject more applications in neighborhoods where per-unit costs are higher (that
is, neighborhoods from which they receive few applications), than in neighborhoods
where they are more active. 
This is a case of increasing returns to scale that are internal to the firm, where the
per-unit cost of information falls as the number of applications processed by an
individual lender increases.  Thus, in neighborhoods where demand is relatively low,
per-unit costs will be lower when fewer lenders are active in the market.  This suggests
that by encouraging all lenders to be active in all neighborhoods, the CRA may be
increasing the costs of lending in neighborhoods with thin demand.
5
Calem (1996) provides some empirical support for these models.  He finds lower
denial rates in communities with thicker markets, that is, more home sales.  While this
may be interpreted as evidence of the external effects of information discussed in Lang
and Nakamura, it probably captures both the external and internal effects, since total
home sales are likely to affect each individual lender's ability to exploit internal
economies of scale, as well as the amount of information available to all lenders in the
neighborhood.
                    
     
5  Limiting the number of lenders in an area may also reduce efficiency if these lenders
are able to exploit monopoly power and limit the number of loans to the neighborhood. 
The potential gains in efficiency from having few lenders in an area must be weighed
against this potential loss.5
In this paper, we empirically test both of these perspectives on information's role,
using national home mortgage lending and neighborhood information.   For each lender
in our sample we construct application denial rates specific to each neighborhood in
which it operates, controlling as best we can for the applicants' individual
characteristics.  We then investigate how the cross-sectional variation in these lender-
neighborhood-specific denial rates is related to a set of neighborhood demographic
variables, plus the volume of applications received by the lender in that neighborhood
(capturing the internal effects of information) and the volume of applications received
by all lenders taking applications in that neighborhood (capturing the external effects of
information).
We then address the impact of this information on neighborhood lending.  For
each neighborhood we sum the external and internal effects of information for the
individual lenders, in order to construct measures for each neighborhood.  We then
array neighborhoods according to their median family income and percent minority
population to see whether the information effects contribute to differences in denial
rates across neighborhoods, consistent with the theoretical models.
We find convincing support for the internal information effect that Gruben,
Neuberger, and Schmidt advance.  The more applications a lender processes from a
given neighborhood, the lower the neighborhood-lender denial rates -- both statistically
and economically.  Furthermore, the low number of applications taken by individual
lenders from specific low-income and minority neighborhoods does contribute to the6
relatively high denial rates in these neighborhoods.  We do not find evidence supporting
the external information effect advanced by Lang and Nakamura.
This suggests that, based strictly on information dynamics, the CRA may inhibit
lending to the most underserved neighborhoods, which have relatively few real estate
transactions.  The CRA's requirement that all lenders be active may hinder many of
them from getting the critical mass of applications they need to obtain information
about the neighborhood and its residents at a lower cost.  Policies that encourage
neighborhood specialization on the part of lenders may be preferable to policies that
force all lenders to act the same.
II.  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
This paper examines the relationship between the percentage of mortgage loan
applications denied by each lender in a neighborhood (census tract) and the
neighborhood lending activity of both the lender and the market as a whole.  Our
analysis employs a two-stage estimation procedure to control for other applicant, lender,
and neighborhood characteristics that may affect the denial rate of an individual lender.
 In the first stage, we use home mortgage application data for 1990 and 1991, collected
under the 1989 revisions to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), to identify
and control for as many borrower and loan characteristics as the limited information in
HMDA permits. We also include dummy variables (fixed effects) for each lender-
neighborhood combination.  In the second stage, the lender-neighborhood fixed effects7
from the first stage are regressed against measures of neighborhood lending activity of
both the lender and neighborhood, along with controls for other lender and
neighborhood characteristics.
In the first stage, we fit a model of the following form:
6
(1)   DENYiLT = bAACi + bLTLENDERTRACTLT +bMMSAM + eiLT,
where DENYiLT is one if the ith application using the Lth lender for a property in the
Tth census tract is denied, and zero otherwise.  ACi is a vector of application
characteristics reported in the HMDA data.  It includes race, gender, marital status,
occupancy, income, loan amount, income-to-loan ratio, federal loan guarantee (Federal
Housing Administration [FHA] or Department of Veterans Affairs [VA]), and the
month of the year the application was acted upon.  LENDERTRACTLT is a set of
dummy variables indicating the lender-tract combination for each application, MSAM 
is a set of dummy variables indicating the metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and eiLTi
is a residual.  The model is specified and estimated separately for each of the two
sample years, 1990 and 1991.  We employ a linear probability specification, mainly
because of the size of the data set.   However, this is an arbitrary specification.
To help minimize the possibility that the differences we identify within and
across neighborhoods reflect nonlinearities in other effects that are correlated with
location, we allow for a considerable degree of nonlinearity in the effects of individual
characteristics.  Race is entered as a set of dummy variables indicating the race of the8
applicant and coapplicant; each is interacted with FHA/VA status as well as income. 
Income and loan amount are entered as linear spline functions with seven knots each,
and the income-to-loan ratio is entered as a series of six dummy variables.  A five-knot
spline for income is interacted with a dummy variable indicating the presence of a
coapplicant, and with dummy variables indicating that the application is for an FHA or
VA loan.  Similarly, a five-knot linear spline of loan amount, and the six dummy
variables indicating ranges of values for the ratio of income to loan amount, are also
interacted with a dummy variable indicating applications for FHA or VA loans. 
In the second stage, we estimate the following model:
(2) ADJDENYLT = b1APPSLT  + b2APPS.T + bL LENDERL + bT CENSUST+  uLT.
The dependent variable, ADJDENYLT, is computed directly from the first-stage results,
as the average of the 1990 and 1991 fixed effects for each lender-tract combination, and
is constructed to have a mean of zero across all lender-tract combinations in the full
HMDA sample.  This dependent variable can be thought of as the denial rate for lender
L, in tract T, adjusted for applicant and MSA characteristics.
APPSLT and APPS.T  are the total number of applications for properties in tract T
received by lender L, and received by all lenders, respectively.  We use these variables
to examine the internal and external effects of information on neighborhood lending by
individual lenders.  If there are economies of scale in neighborhood lending that are
internal to the lender, then neighborhood denial rates will be lower for those lenders
                                                                                                                                                
     
6  A detailed description of the first-stage estimation and the data used in the analysis9
with a large presence in the neighborhood, and the coefficient on APPSLT will be
negative.  On the other hand, if there are externalities in neighborhood lending then
denial rates for all lenders will be lower in high- application neighborhoods,
independent of the number of applications received by the individual lender, as all
lenders benefit from the information generated by higher levels of activity.  In this case,
 we expect the coefficient on APPS.T to be negative.
A vector of tract characteristics drawn from the 1980 and 1990 Decennial
Censuses (CENSUST) is included to control for other neighborhood characteristics that
may affect denial rates in the tract.  Specific variables included in  CENSUST  are: 1)
percent minority population of each tract, defined here as Hispanic, black, Asian, native
American, and other race, 2) median family income, 3) median owner-occupied house
value, 4) age distribution of household heads, 5) distribution of residential dwellings by
number of units in the structure, 6) percentage of one-to-four-unit residential properties
that were vacant and rented, and 7) variables indicating the distribution of the housing
stock by age.  We used 1990 values for each of these variables (except the housing age
variables, which used 1980 data), as well as for the change from 1980 to 1990.  To
control for characteristics of lenders that may affect the rate at which they deny
applications in all neighborhoods, we include a set of dummy variables representing
each lender (LENDERL).  As in the first stage, the estimation allows for a considerable
degree of nonlinearity.
                                                                                                                                                
can be found in Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman (1994).10
III.  DATA
Mortgage Loan Application and Disposition Data
Data on individual loan applications and dispositions for 1990 and 1991, used in
the first-stage estimation for the denial rate and to calculate APPSLT and APPS.T  in the
second stage, are collected under the 1989 revisions to HMDA.  The amended HMDA
data form one of the most comprehensive sets of statistics on mortgage lending
available in the United States.
7  Nearly all commercial banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions, and other mortgage lending institutions (primarily mortgage
banks) with assets of more than $10 million and an office in an MSA are required to
report on each mortgage loan purchased and loan application filed during the calendar
year.  Lenders must report the loan amount, census tract of the property, whether the
property is owner-occupied, the purpose of the loan (home purchase, home
improvement, or refinancing), loan guarantee (conventional, FHA, or VA), loan
disposition (loan approved and originated, application approved but withdrawn, no
lender action taken because the data were incomplete or the application was withdrawn,
or application denied), race and gender of the loan applicant (and coapplicant, if any),
and income relied on by the lending institution in making the loan decision.
8,9
                    
     
7  While the HMDA data are the most comprehensive data available on mortgage lending,
they are still limited in the information they provide concerning each application.  In
particular, credit history and down-payment information are not reported.
     
8  See Canner and Smith (1991, 1992) for a comprehensive discussion of the HMDA data.11
In total, 9,333 financial institutions filed HMDA reports for 1990 on 6,595,089
loans.  In 1991, 9,365 institutions filed on 7,939,107 loans.  In the first-stage analysis,
we use the 4,072,158 loan applications for the purchase of one-to-four-unit residential
properties that were acted upon (denied or accepted) by lenders in the two years.
10, 
11 
These applications were received by 8,745 separate institutions operating in 40,008
census tracts in all 341 of the MSAs defined as of 1990.  For our analysis, we define
                                                                                                                                                
     
9  Institutions with assets of less than $30 million are not required to report race, income, or
gender for loan applicants.  In addition, the HMDA filings contain many errors and
inconsistencies, even after extensive editing by the receiving agencies.  We dealt with missing
and implausible data by using a "hot deck" imputation procedure similar to that used by the U.S.
Census Bureau.  Applications with missing or implausible data were statistically matched to
applications for the same type of loan in the same census tract that came closest to them in
reported characteristics (race, loan action, income, and loan amount).  Missing values were filled
in using the variable value of the matched observation.  Overall, income was imputed for 4.9
percent, loan amount for 1.5 percent, gender for 4.0 percent, and race for 5.6 percent of the study
sample applications.
     
10  The following loan filings were omitted from the sample: 1) loans purchased from other
institutions (because they did not require an action by the reporting lender and often were missing
geographic information) and applications for properties outside the MSAs in which the lender
had an office (5,670,768 applications dropped), 2)  refinancing (2,216,810 dropped) or home
improvement loan applications (1,649,470 dropped) 3) applications for multifamily homes
(55,703 dropped), and 4) applications that never reached the stage of lender action because they
were either withdrawn by the applicant or closed for incompleteness (869,287 dropped).  The
final sample includes some mobile home loans and condominium loans, since they were treated
as one-to-four-family units in the HMDA reporting guidelines.
     
11  The distinction between loan types may be blurred. Institutions were allowed to report
home improvement loans secured by a first lien as either home purchase or home
improvement loans.  Some home improvement loans may also be reported as refinancings if a
new first lien was issued.  Some refinancing may not have been reported at all.  If a
refinancing was undertaken primarily for a purpose other than home purchase or home
improvement (such as college expenses or to start a business), then it did not have to be
reported.  Similarly, unless the borrower specifically noted home improvement as a reason for
the loan, lenders did not have to report home equity or second-lien mortgages.12
lender at the MSA level; thus, an institution reporting applications for two different
MSAs is treated as two different lenders.  There are 23,248 such lenders in the sample
used to estimate equation (1).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the applications reported for 1990 and
1991 under HMDA.  Clearly, housing credit applicants are a select group of American
families.  Applicants' median income ($48,000) is substantially higher than that of all
families in MSAs ($37,918) as reported in the 1990 Decennial Census.
12   It is also
apparent that application and denial rates differ substantially by race and by income of
applicants.
                    
     
12  In the HMDA data, household income may be slightly understated, as it reflects only the
portion of an applicant's income needed for mortgage qualification.13
Census Data
Data drawn from the 1980 and 1990 Decennial Censuses are used to construct
many of the explanatory variables in the second stage of the analysis.  In filing 1990 and
1991 HMDA reports, lenders were required to use 1980 census tract definitions. 
However, the Census Bureau reports the most relevant census information, that for
1990, using 1990 tract definitions.  Unfortunately, although most tracts remained the
same, some boundary definitions changed between 1980 and 1990.  To resolve this
problem, we decided to use 1980 tract definitions as the mode of analysis and to use
estimates of 1990 census information.  We obtained data from Claritas Corporation,
which aggregated block-level 1990 census data to 1980-defined tract totals.  Change
variables are calculated using 1980 census information and Claritas' 1990 estimates.
Census tracts are dropped from the sample for several reasons.  The census and
HMDA data could not be aligned for a few outer areas of some MSAs that were not
tracted in 1980, so our sample does not include them.  We lack census information on
Puerto Rico and thus exclude it from the analysis.  We also drop tracts that had no
residents, those with insufficient numbers to provide racial breakdowns, and those with
less than 50 dwellings.  We also require that each lender-tract combination used in the
second stage have loan applications in 1990 and 1991, to control for potential bias in
HMDA reporting.
The net effect of these restrictions is to reduce the number of lender-tract
combinations used in the second-stage estimation to 278,808, less than one-third the14
number in the original sample.  The second-stage sample represents 36,008 of the
original 40,008 census tracts, 12,234 of the original 23,248 MSA lenders, and
2,456,834 of the original 4,072,158 loan applications.  The major cause of the sample
reduction is the loss of those lender-tract combinations where the lender reported
applications in only one of the two years.  Either the lender did not report under HMDA
one of the two years, or a reporting lender received an application for a property in the
tract only one of the two years.
The sample distribution of tracts, one-to-four-family housing units, loan
applications, and denial rates are reported in table 2, including information for the total
population and for minorities.  This table shows distributions for census tracts sorted by
minority population share in 1990, change in minority population share from 1980 to
1990, share of black population, share of Hispanic population, median owner-occupied
housing value in 1990, percentage change in median housing value from 1980 to
1990,
13 median family income in 1990, and center city/suburban and MSA size.
The most interesting comparison in table 2 is between column 2 (the stock of
one-to-four-unit residential properties) and columns 3 and 4 (loan applications for
comparable units).  Tracts with less than 5 percent minority population are
proportionately represented in loan applications, whereas tracts with 10 percent to 50
percent minority populations have disproportionately more loan applicants, and those
with more than 50 percent minority populations have disproportionately fewer
                    
     
13  Measured in nominal terms.  The Consumer Price Index rose about 50 percent over this
period.15
applicants.  Predominantly black tracts seem to be particularly underrepresented.  It also
appears that tracts with median family incomes below $40,000 have a
disproportionately small number of applicants.  These differences related to
neighborhood characteristics are consistent with those related to characteristics of the
individual applicants discussed earlier.
IV.  ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
Parameter estimates for the first-stage regressions predicting the denial of an
application are presented in table 3.
 14,15  When examining these numbers, one can
interpret a positive coefficient as the expected increase in the probability that an
applicant's loan will be denied as a result of a one-unit increase in the independent
variable, holding all other variables constant (specifically, the applicant's MSA, census
tract, and lender).  Thus, the coefficients on race, for example, represent the expected
difference in the probability that a white and black applicant with the same income,
gender, FHA/VA status, loan amount, month of action date, MSA, census tract, and
lender will be refused a loan.  Thus interpreted, the estimated black/white (.104 and
                    
     
14  The model was actually estimated using deviations about the lender-tract means, a
method which is computationally equivalent to a single-component fixed-effects model.  For
1990 (1991), the home purchase sample had 1,984,688 (2,087,470) observations located in
607,631 (662,571) unique combinations of 40,008 (39,963) tracts and 20,695 (26,508)
lenders spread across 340 (341) MSAs; thus, the average tract had about 15 lenders in each
year, each of which served about 30 tracts per MSA.
     
15  The reported standard errors in table 3 are those from a standard regression program. 
They may be biased due to heteroskedasticity stemming from the linear-probability-model
specification.16
.106) and Hispanic/white (.038 and .052) differences for conventional home purchase
loans are quite significant.   Similarly, the differences by applicant's income are also
quite large, particularly for the lowest-income applicants.  The estimates in table 3
indicate that, for all racial groups, the expected probability that an application will be
denied decreases almost 1 percentage point per $1,000 income up to an income of
$20,000, and 0.3 percentage points per $1,000 from $20,000 to $40,000; this implies a
difference of 10 percentage points between applicants with $10,000 of income and
those with $20,000.  Since U.S. neighborhoods tend to be differentiated by income and
race, these differences in the probability of denial related to the applicant's race and
income contribute to the observed differences across neighborhoods. 
Parameter estimates for total applications for properties in a tract (APPLT) and
total applications received by the individual lender (APP.T) from the second-stage
regressions are presented in tables 4 and 5.
16  Parameter estimates for other variables
are reported in Appendix table 1. All models are estimated using ordinary least squares.
Table 4 presents the results for our basic model, in which APPSLT and APPS.T
are entered as series of dummy variables to allow for possible nonlinearities.  The
coefficients on APPSLT indicate that denial rates are significantly lower for lenders that
process more applications from the neighborhood, controlling for the total number of
applications processed for the neighborhood, other tract characteristics, the applicant
                    
     
16  All models are estimated using ordinary least squares.  The reported regressions give
equal weight to each lender-tract combination.  In unreported regressions, each model is
estimated giving equal weight to each tract, and giving equal weight to each application.  The
estimates are robust to these alternative weightings.17
characteristics included in the first-stage estimation, the lender, and the MSA.  In
addition to being statistically significant, the estimated effects are quite large.  The
predicted denial rate for a lender that processes 30 or more applications for properties in
a given tract is 3.1 percentage points lower than an otherwise identical lender
processing less than 3 applications from the tract.  There apparently is no consistent
pattern to the coefficients estimating the relationship between an individual lender's
denial rate and the total number of applications processed by all lenders, although an F-
test rejects the hypothesis of no relationship (F= 2.78). 
An alternative specification of the model is estimated with APPSLT and APPS.T 
entered linearly, rather than as a series of dummy variables.  While this specification is
more restrictive, it produces a summary measure of the underlying relationship that is
not apparent in the dummy variable specification.  The estimated coefficients for
APPSLT and APPS.T are reported as model 2 in table 4.   They indicate that denial rates
decline as the number of applications processed by the individual lender increases, and
increase as the total number of applications in the tract increases.   Both estimated
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of confidence.   
In the above estimation, we assume that census tracts represent homogeneous
neighborhoods and therefore estimate the models based on the number of applications
in a tract.  While this criterion is used to define census tract, in practice this may not be
the case.  Since neighborhoods tend to shift over time, this mismatch is likely to be
large in our data because the loan application data were collected 10 years after the18
1980 census tracts were constructed.  As a result, the 1980 census tract definitions may
over- or underestimate the size of neighborhoods in 1990.  We attempt to overcome this
mismatch by estimating a model in which each lender's share of total applications in the
tract and total applications per one-to-four-family housing unit in the tract are
substituted for APPSLT and APPS.T.  The coefficient estimates for APPSLT and APPS.T ,
entered as series of dummy variables and entered linearly, are reported in table 5, as
models 3 and 4, respectively.  These estimates are generally consistent with those
reported above.  Lenders' denial rates decline significantly as their share of the market
increases, and the elasticity is comparable to estimates for APPSLT in the basic model
(table 4).  In addition, while the estimated coefficient on applications per housing unit is
negative, the elasticity is small and we cannot reject the hypothesis of no relationship at
the 10 percent level. 
We also estimate all four models separately for minority and white applicants. 
For both groups we find that denial rates decline as the number of applications
processed by the individual lender increases, and increase as the total number of
applications in the tract increases.  There is little differences in coefficient estimates
across the two groups of applicants.
Thus, in all specifications we find that a lender's neighborhood denial rate
declines as the lender processes more applications from the neighborhood.  This finding
is consistent with  internal economies of scale in neighborhood lending related to
private information.  We do not find any evidence of positive externalities related to19
information in neighborhood lending.  If anything, increases in applications processed
by other neighborhood lenders slightly increase the denial rate of a given lender,
holding constant the number of applications processed by that individual lender,
suggesting negative externalities.  
There are several alternative explanations of our results.  Some lenders enter into
agreements with developers where the lender agrees to provide financing and the
developer effectively “prescreens” applicants for the lender. Thus, a lender may receive
a large number of applications from a given tract, and have a low denial rate on
applications from the tract, but the low denial rate would have nothing to do with
information gained from processing applications.  We have no data on these
partnerships, but since these large developments are more likely in suburban than in
central city neighborhoods, we estimated all models separately for central cities and for
suburbs.  Our results do not differ substantially between the two geographic areas.
Alternatively, it may be that low denial rates are attracting large numbers of
applicants, rather than large numbers of applications leading to lower denial rates, as we
are assuming.  Two considerations work against this interpretation.   First, we include a
dummy variable for each lender that will control for systematic differences across
lenders.  So, it would have to be that for some the lender has a lower denial rate in one
tract than in others, and that this attracts more applications only for properties in that
tract.  Second, marginal applicants more likely than others to be influenced by20
considerations such as which lender has the lowest denial rate, and this would tend to
increase the denial rates for these lenders.
Another possibility is that people may believe, correctly or not, that the large
lender in their neighborhood has access to more and better information when processing
loan applications, and as a result, these lenders attract not only more applicants but also
more creditworthy ones, and therefore have lower denial rates.  If large lenders are also
low-rate lenders, this is consistent with Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman's (1995) finding
that lenders advertising low interest rates tend to attract more creditworthy applicants
and have lower denial rates than lenders advertising high rates.  For this to explain our
results, a lender's reputation has to be neighborhood-based, not metropolitan-area-
based, since our estimates include fixed effects for each lender, and the applicants
would have to be more creditworthy in terms of characteristics that are not included in
our first-stage estimates. 
Denial Rates in Low-income and Minority Neighborhoods
In this and the following subsections, we examine the extent to which the internal
and external effects identified in the previous section can account for the observed
differences in denial rates across neighborhoods arrayed by median family income and
by percent minority population.  We begin by documenting neighborhood differences in
actual denial rates and denial rates adjusted for applicant characteristics.  We then use
our estimates of the internal and external effects from the previous section to estimate21
the extent to which cross-tract differences in adjusted denial rates are attributable to
differences in internal and external effects for individual lenders.
Loan denial rates arrayed by median family income in the tract are presented in
figure 1.  Denial rates arrayed by minority percentage in the tract are presented in figure
2.  Each figure shows two separate denial rates: 1) the actual denial rate controlling for
nothing (equivalent to the numbers presented in table 3), and 2) the denial rate adjusted
for individual characteristics using the coefficient estimates from the first-stage analysis
(table 3).   The adjusted denial rates are normalized to equal the actual denial rate in
tracts with median incomes of $80,000 or more (figure 1) and in tracts with a minority
population of less than 1 percent (figure 2).
The gap in actual denial rates between low- and high-income tracts is huge:  31.3
percent of all loan applications for properties in tracts with median family incomes of
less than $10,000 are rejected, compared with 12.9 percent in tracts with median
incomes of $80,000 or more.  Moreover, although much of the difference disappears
when individual characteristics are controlled for, a significant difference remains:  The
gap between the denial rates in the lowest and highest income tracts is reduced from
18.4 to 10.3 percentage points. 
The gap in actual denial rates between white and minority neighborhoods
(defined by the percent minority population in the tract) is also quite large, and can also
be attributed in large part to differences in the characteristics of individual applicants. 
The difference between the all-white and all-minority tracts, for example, falls from22
16.7 percentage points when nothing is controlled for, to 8.0 percentage points when
individual characteristics are controlled for.
Information Effects on Neighborhood Denial Rates
For each tract, the internal and external information effects equal the weighted
sums of the information effects for each lender in the tract, where the weights reflect
each lender’s share of total applications in the tract.  Thus, the extent to which the
internal and external effects of information, identified for individual lenders in tables 4
and 5, contribute to the observed differences in denial rates across tracts will depend on
the size distribution of lenders within and across tracts, as well as the relative number of
total applications in each tract.  Figure 3 arrays various tract characteristics, including
the average number of applications per lender and total applications, by median family
income of the tract and by percent minority.  On average, individual lenders receive
relatively few applications from low-income and minority tracts, therefore, the inability
to exploit internal economies of scale lending in these neighborhoods may account for a
portion of the higher observed denial rates.  The total number of applications in these
tracts is also lower than in the higher-income and majority tracts.  Given our estimate of
a slightly positive external effect of information for individual lenders, this may actually
work in favor of applicants for properties in low-income and minority tracts.
To calculate the internal information effect for each tract, we first calculate the
internal information effect for each lender-tract combination based on the actual
number of applications in the lender-tract and the coefficients from our basic23
regression, reported in table 4.  For each lender this is the difference between the
predicted denial rate for that lender and for a hypothetical lender, otherwise identical,
that processes fewer than three applications in the tract (the omitted category in table 4).
 The internal information effect for each lender in the tract is then weighted by the
lender's share of total applications for the tract to construct the effect for the tract.
In figure 4, the external and internal information effects are arrayed by the
median family income (measured in thousands of dollars) in the tract.  The information
effects are the weighted averages of the individual tract effects where the weights are
each tract's share of total applications from tracts in that income category.  These effects
are then normalized to have a value of zero in tracts with median family incomes below
$10,000.  The internal information effect plotted in figure 4 shows our estimates of the
difference in denial rates across tracts with different median family incomes that is
attributable to the size distribution of lenders in the tracts relative to the size
distribution of lenders in the lowest income tracts.  Similarly, the external information
effect is our estimate of the differences in denial rates that is attributable to differences
in the total number of applications processed.  The total effect is the sum of the external
and internal information effects.
The internal information effect declines steadily as median tract income
increases, up to a median family income of $30,000, and is relatively constant beyond
$30,000.  The estimates indicate that, independent of other factors, we would expect
denial rates to decrease as median family income increases because individual lenders24
tend to process more applications from the same tract.   According to these estimates, 1
percentage point of the difference in adjusted denial rates between tracts with a median
family income below $10,000 and those with a median family income of $30,000 is
attributable to differences in the economies of scale in private information  realized by
lenders in these tracts.  This is almost one-third of the 3.5 percentage point difference in
the adjusted denial rates in these tracts (figure 1).  The external information effect
increases as median family income increases up to about $45,000 and then levels off.
In figure 5, the external and internal information effects are arrayed by the
percentage minority population in the tract.   The effects are normalized to have a value
of zero in all minority tracts.  While somewhat less striking than the estimates by
median family income, the internal information effect declines steadily as the percent
minority in the tract decreases, and accounts for .64 percentage point of the 8.0
percentage point difference in adjusted denial rates in all minority and all white tracts.  
Again, the external information effect increases as the percent minority population
increases, though, since this effect tends to be smaller, the total effect is negative.25
V.  CONCLUSIONS
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 was a response to concerns that
certain neighborhoods, primarily low-income and minority neighborhoods, were being
underserved by lenders.  The primary method of enforcing the CRA has been to require
all lenders to be active in community lending, punishing those who do not comply.  Our
finding that economies of scale in neighborhood lending accrue to the individual
lenders suggests that forcing all lenders to be active in all neighborhoods may inhibit
lending to the most underserved neighborhoods, where there are relatively few
transactions.  
Based strictly on information dynamics, efficiency would be increased if
individual lenders were allowed to specialize so that they could achieve the critical
mass of applications required to exploit the economies of scale in neighborhood
lending.  However, when designing the compliance mechanism for CRA, regulators
need to weigh potential efficiency gains from having a few specialized lenders in an
area against the potential losses that may result if these lenders can exploit monopoly
power and limit the number of loans to the neighborhood.  Alternative enforcement
mechanisms that might be more efficient than the current system include allowing
individual lenders to meet their CRA obligations by helping to finance banks
specializing in community lending; a regulated monopoly; or a system of tradeable
permits like the one suggested by Klausner (1995).26
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 American Economic Review, vol. 77 (March), pp. 228-231.Table 1: Characteristics of Mortgage Applications, National Sample, 1990 and 1991 HMDA
Percent of Percent of Denial
Sample Loan dollars Rate
Race of Applicant
Native American







Same Race as Applicant













Male Applicant, Female Co-applicant
Female Applicant, Male Co-applicant
Male Applicant and Co-applicant































































































Home Purchase Loan Applications




Loan Accepted and Withdrawn
Loan Originated
Loan Kept by Originator (% of originations)
Loan Sold to FNMA (% of originations)
Loan Sold to GNMA (% of originations)
Loan Sold to FHLMC (% of originations)
Loan Sold Elsewhere (% of originations)
















































Median Income ($1,000s) $48
Median Loan Request ($1,000s) $78
Number of Loans 4,072,158
1Up to three reasons for denial could be given, and answers were voluntary. Each category gives the percent of all
denials that gave that reason as one of the three.
Source: Authorst calculation.Table 2: Distribution of 1990 Census Population and 1990/1991 HMDA Loan Applications by TractCharacteristics
Home Purchase Loans
Portion of Portion of
all1-4 Applications Denial Rates
Family Units Total Minority White Black Hispanic
Level & Change in Minority Population Share
Less than 5 Percent Minority, 1990
5 to 10 Percent Minority, 1990
Rose <5 Percent from 1980
Rose >5 Percent from 1980
10 to 50 Percent Minority, 1990
Rose <5 Percent from 1980
Rose 5 to 15 Percent from 1980
Rose >15 Percent from 1980
50 Percent or more Minority, 1990
Rose <5 Percent from 1980
Rose 5 to 15 Percent from 1980
ROse >15 Percent from 1980





Center City, MSA size, 1990
Center City
MSA Less than 1 million
MSA 1 to 2 million
MSA More than 2 million
Non-Center City
MSA Less than 1 million ‘
MSA 1 to 2 million





































































































































1Percentages sum to 100 for each group for each column.
Source: Authors’ calculation.Table 3: Linear Probability Model of Loan Denial(1) or Acceptance (0), Home Purchase Loan Applications
1990 1991
Coefllcient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Owner-occupied (Dummy) .00649***
Race (Dummies, "White" Is Base Group)




Other Race Applicants .03043***
Mixed Race, Minority Co-applicant (Dummy) .00764**
Mixed Race, Non-minority Co-applicant (Dummy) –.02324***
Income, Interacted With Race





Other Race Applicant –.00982***
Income Splines ($1,000's)
Income Spline at $20,000 .00604***
Income Spline at $40,000 .00283***
Income Spline at $60,000 .00063***
Income Spline at $80,000 .00013
Income Spline at $100,000 .00012
Income Spline at$150,000 –.00003
Income Spline at $200,000 .00011
Loan Amount ($1,000's)
Loan Amount –.00191***
Loan Amount Spline at $20,000 .00027
Loan Amount Spline at $40,000 .00179***
Loan Amount Spline at $60,000 –.00019
Loan Amount Spline at $80,000 .00038*
Loan Amount Spline at $100,000 –.00020
Loan Amount Spline at$150,000 .00022***
Loan Amount Spline at $200,000 –.00029***
Loan-to-Income Ratio (Dummies, Less than 1.5 Is Base Group)
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0 –.01012***
Ratio of2.0 to 2.25 –.01158***
Ratio of2.25 to 2.5 –.01176***
Ratio of2.5 to 2.75 –.00713***
Ratio of2.75 to 3.0 .00362










































































































Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Applicant Gender (Dummies, Female Applicant, No Co-applicant Is Base Group)
Male Applicant, Female Co-applicant
Female Applicant, Male Co-applicant
Male Applicant and Co-applicant
Female Applicant and Co-applicant
Male Applicant, No Co-applicant
Income, Interacted With No Co-applicant
Income
Income Spline at $20,000
Income Spline at $40,000
Income Spline at $60,000
Income Spline at $80,000
Income Spline at $100,000
















Income, Interacted With VA or FHA Loan
Income
Income Spline at $20,000
Income Spline at $40,000
Income Spline at $60,000
Income Spline at $80,000































































































































Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Loan Amount, Interacted With VA or FHA Loan
Loan Amount .00359***
Loan Amount Spline at $20,000 –.00249***
Loan Amount Spline at $40,000 –.00230***
Loan Amount Spline at $60,000 .00067*
Loan Amount Spline at $80,000 –.00043
Loan Amount Spline at $100,000 .00058*
Loan-to-Income Ratio, Interacted With VA or FHA Loan
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0 –.00335
Ratio of2.0 to 2.25 –.00521
Ratio of2.25 to 2.5 –.00625
Ratio of2.5 to 2.75 .00011
Ratio of2.75 to 3.0 –.00476
Ratio Over 3.0 –.00744













Number of Observations 1,984,688
Mean Denial Rate in Regression Sample .148
Number of Tract/Institution Dummies 607,631
R Squared (Including Tract/Institution Dummies) .457
R Squared (Variation around Tract/Institution Means) .022
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the1 percent level.











































































Source: Authors’ calculation.Table4: Lender/tractAdjustedLoanDenialRateRegression,Basic Models, SelectedCoefficients
Coefficient Standard Error Mean
Model 1
Number of Loans by Lender in Tract (Dummies, Less than 3 is Base Group)
3 or 4 Loans –.00538*** .00151
5to9Loans –.01333*** .00157
10 to 19 Loans –.02230*** .00191
20 to 29Loans –.02664*** .00278
30 or More Loans –.03081*** .00302
Total Number ofLoans in Tract (Dummies, Less than 10is Base Group)
10to 19 Loans
20 to 29Loans
30 to 39 Loans
40 to 49 Loans
50 to 59 Loans
60 to 69Loans
70 to 79 Loans
80 to 89 Loans
90 to 99 Loans
100 to 124 Loans
125 to 149 Loans
150 to 174 Loans
175 to 199 Loans
200 to 299 Loans

















Number of Loans by
Lender in Tract –.00033***
Total Number of
Loans in Tract .000008**








































Source: Authors’ calculation.Table 5:AdditionalLender/tract AdjustedLoanDenialRateRegressions,SelectedCoefficients
Coefficient Standard Error Mean
Model 3:
Lender Tract Market Share (Dummies, Less than 2 Percent is Base Group)
2 to 5 Percent –.00954*** .00156 .332
5 to 10 Percent –.01629*** .00179 .259
10 to 15 Percent –.02192*** .00224 .105 .
15 to 25 Percent –.02468*** .00253 .077
More than 25 Percent –.03092*** .00342 .035
Ratio of Tract Applications to 1-4 Units (Dummies, Less than 3 Percent is Base Group)
3 to 5 Percent
5 to 7 Percent
7 to 9 Percent
9 to 11 Percent
11 to 13 Percent
13 to 15 Percent
15 to 17 Percent
17 to 19 Percent
19to21 Percent
21 to 23 Percent
23 to 25 Percent
25 to 27 Percent
27 to 29 Percent
29to31 Percent

















Lender–Tract Market Share (%) –.00082***
Ratio of Tract Applications to 1-4 Units (%) –.00012




































Source: Authors’ calculation.Appendix Table 1: Lender/Tract Adjusted Denial Rate Regression Basic Model, Coefficient Estimates
Coefficient Standard Error
Central City (Dummy =l) –.00894 .00129
Minority Share of Tract Population 1990
Minority Share .03115 .06676
Minority Share Spline at .05 .03745 .09680
Minority Share Spline at .10 –.01656 .05290
Minority Share Spline at .25 –.05151 .02448
Minority Share Spline at .50 .05570 .01811
Change in Minority Share 1980-90 (Dummies, less than zero is Base Group)
Rose 0-.05 –.00012 .00167
Rose .05-.10 .00088 .00210
Rose. 10-.15 –.00246 .00258
Rose more than .15 –.00043 .00279
Median Family Income of the Tract, 1990
Median Family Income –.05264 .04318
Median Income Spline at $25,000 –.02130 .04552
Median Income Spline at $40,000 .00101 .02395
Median Income Spline at $55,000 .05716 .01824
Change in Median Family Income 1980-90 (Dummies, less than 25percent is Base Group)
Rose 25 to 50 percent .01196 .00397
Rose 50 to 100 percent .01322 .00412
Rose more than 100 percent .01319 .00448
Median House Value, 1990
Median House Value –.08771 .01860
Median House Value Spline at 50,000 .06136 .01971
Median House Value Spline at 100,000 .01353 .00840
Median House Value Spline at 150,000 .00560 .00536
Change in Median House Values 1980-90 (Dummies, less than $25,000 is Base Group)
Rose $25,000-$50,000 .00550 .00225
Rose $50,000-$100,000 .00850 .00276
Rose $100,000-$150,000 .00900 .00345
Rose More than $150,000 .00684 .00300
Median Age of Heads of Households
Share Age Group 2 –.01715 .02639
Share Age Group 3 –.00979 .02364
Share Age Group 4 .05995 .03223
Share Age Group 5 .03373 .03381
Share Age Group 6 –.08456 .03165
Share Age Group 7 –.02643 .02474Appendix Table 1: Continued
Coefficient Standard Error
Distribution of Housing Units by Type of Structures (1 unit detached is the omitted category) .
Share 1 Unit Attached –.04477 .00624
Share 2 Units –.00883 .01158
Share 3-4 Units –.03793 .01346
Share 5 or more Units .00334 .00527
Share Mobile Homes .02049 .00771
Distribution of Housing Units by Occupancy Status (Owner Occupied is the omitted category)
Share Rental .04073 .00900
Share Vacant .11983 .01354
Changes in Housing Characteristics, 1980-90
Change in Total Housing Units, 1980-90 .00472 .00280
Change in 1-4 Family Housing Units, 1980-90 –.00507 .00290
Change in Share Rental, 1980-90 .00979 .01090
Change in Share Vacant, 1980-90 –.02661 .01595
Age Distribution of Housing Units, 1980 (Built before 1949 is the omitted category)
Share Built 1979-80 –.02335 .01171
Share Built 1975-78 –.00962 .00736
Share Built 1970-74 .01481 .00640
Share Built 1960-69 –.01246 .00517
Share Built 1950-59 –.02131 .00525
Share Built 1940-49 –.02326 .00809